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Psychological sciences are in desperate need of epistemological reflection. This is required
by the very object of study, not because epistemological elaboration is missing in itself. The
psyche is historical (Tateo & Valsiner, 2015) as well as its physiological substrate (Wickens,
2014). So, the whole system of concepts, methodologies, and forms of knowledge must
develop over time. Epistemology of psychological sciences must constantly change with its
object of study also because our knowledge of the mind is affecting in return our
psychological experience in everyday life. Besides, since the very origins of the study of
psyche, epistemological, physical, ontological, ethical, and metaphysical problems
intertwined. We are in a constant need for epistemological reflection in psychology also
because the “mind” (or whatever is called the object of study) is the only example of the
object studying itself in the vast and uncertain horizon of human knowledge.
These epistemological issues constitute the background on top of which Ivana Marková
builds her learned and articulated reflection in the book The Dialogical Mind: Common Sense
and Ethics. Unfortunately, such an airy critical discussion about the object and the
foundations of psychological knowledge is becoming quite unusual in contemporary
research. It seems that dealing with meta-theoretical and epistemological questions is
moving the efforts of psychology away from its very empirical goals. After all, who cares
about the general justification of the knowledge produced by psychological research if it only
matters what kind of empirical evidence can be produced or what applications one can get
to support very specific and short-range theories? Marková is instead one of the few
scholars left to care about the very foundations of psychology and to grasp the complexity
and concerns of its ultimate object and producer: the human being.
The Dialogical Mind is actually the summa of Marková’s lifelong work on dialogicality. The
core of the book is the opposition between “monological” and “dialogical” epistemologies in
psychology. According to the author, such a distinction—one among the many others we
have in psychology yet more than others relevant to the understanding of the development
of this science—is still orienting the different developments of psychological sciences. The
monological epistemology, for instance, can be traced back to Descartes, Locke, and Kant.
It is characterized by an individualistic understanding of the psyche and a normative view of
the processes of thought. The dialogical epistemology is instead rooted in the philosophy of
authors such as Giambattista Vico (Tateo, 2017), Fichte, Hegel, and Bakhtin. The dialogical
approach in psychology is based on the axiom of the inseparability of the Ego-Alter system.
The mind is inherently dialogical, that is, in interaction with the Other—individuals,
institutions, cultures, past, present, and future—in a totality that is often referred as Umwelt
(von Uexküll, 1934/1992). The individual organism cannot exist as isolated from its
environment, and in the case of human beings, the environment is constituted by
meaningful relationships of interdependency with the others.
Marková claims that the relation of interdependency Self-Other is also fundamentally
ethical, that is, it evolves in our daily encounters and joint activities with the others who
require an adequate response to their social demands, just as we require of the other an
adequate response to our personal demands in return. Since infancy, the human being
learns that well-being depends on this well-tuned way of interacting with the Other. One
could say that this is just common sense. “Precisely!” would answer Marková. This is why
her discussion starts exactly from the longstanding opposition between science and common
sense. In the first part of the book, indeed, she presents her view of common sense as the
vital characteristic of social and psychological life, based on the Self-Other ethical
relationship.
Since the origin of Western epistemological reflection, two modes of thinking and knowing
have been acknowledged. They have been given several names: mythos and logos,
episteme and endoxa, science and common sense, and so on. One of the constant topics of
epistemology was that of establishing whether science and common sense are two
irreducibly different modes of knowing—with the former of course higher than the latter—or
if they are in some continuity. Marková shows how different psychological approaches are
positioned with respect to the issue of mythos and logos but also how psychological sciences
had a lot of hard times in trying to establish common sense as its object of study.
In the second part of the book, the author presents instead the crucial argument that the
different mental functions acquire a completely different nature and meaning depending on
which epistemological approach we adopt. Indeed, dialogical and interactional
epistemologies imply that the object of study and the forms of knowing are radically
different from monological epistemologies, as well as differing in the hierarchy of mental
functions. The object of study in dialogical epistemologies becomes “the Ego-Alter as an
irreducible ethical and ontological unit” (Marková, 2016, p. 94). For instance, it would make
little sense even to study the individual brain out of its relationship with other brains or
objects in the environment. Yet the form of knowing is also dialogical, as knowing occurs as
the Ego-Alter-Object relation. This implies that we always know with something or someone,
rather than about someone or something. The researcher builds dialogical concepts, that is,
assumes that the relationship between Ego and Alter always refers to an object, but also
that the relationship between Ego and Object is always established in a context of activity
that includes the Alter—whether as present partner of interaction or distal generalized other
or internalized voice of the other. Finally, the hierarchy of mental functions is also changing.
If we acknowledge the relevance of praxis, everyday thinking, ethical relationships, and
common sense in psychological life, then the normative view of rational thinking as the
higher form of mental activity is no longer sustainable: “the metaphor of ‘inferior’ and
‘superior’ thinking” (Marková, 2016, p. 214) should definitely disappear. Marková shows
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how imagination, intuition, language, trust, and so on play a ubiquitous role in everyday
psychological life, often underpinning rationality itself.
Marková is of course advocating for the adoption of dialogical epistemology in psychology.
Yet she does not claim that in a science war, a school should prevail over the other. She
rather calls for a dialogical turn in social psychology. Dialogical epistemology implies a
different commitment of the researcher with his or her object. The researcher and the
object change and develop together exactly because of their encounter: They make a
history together. This is why we need a constant epistemological reflection, abandoning the
illusion of a total distancing between subject and object of the psychological science through
empirical devices.
I think that the author’s final argumentation is that dialogical epistemologies can help to
develop any kind of psychological research and professional practice. No matter if you are a
neuropsychologist, a social psychologist, a psychoanalyst, a hard cognitivist, or a cultural
psychologist, you will find the confrontation with Marková’s book a stimulating source for
your own epistemological reflection and eventually a starting point for new approaches to
psychological research.
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